發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-02 20:21

  本文選題：金融企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：過去的十多年里經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們對(duì)高管薪酬的關(guān)注逐漸增多，但這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的研究大部分來(lái)自于像美國(guó)和英國(guó)這樣的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，而且發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家數(shù)據(jù)的可用性是關(guān)注高管薪酬的另一個(gè)重要原因�？紤]到公司治理會(huì)在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中發(fā)揮重要的作用，所以關(guān)于高管薪酬方面的研究在不斷地增加。然而，既然高管薪酬在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的研究如此重要，那么對(duì)于發(fā)展中國(guó)家的企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，關(guān)注高管薪酬也同樣是不可或缺的。特別是，對(duì)于轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)體，通過各種改革措施，努力把他們的國(guó)有企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變成為有利可圖的現(xiàn)代化企業(yè)，有效的管理者激勵(lì)條款是經(jīng)濟(jì)成功轉(zhuǎn)型的關(guān)鍵因素。由于高管績(jī)效薪酬代表著最高管理層的激勵(lì)體系，仔細(xì)研究現(xiàn)代化企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)是否對(duì)高管薪酬有一定的影響是有意義的，它為當(dāng)前的努力改革和未來(lái)的改革措施的設(shè)計(jì)評(píng)價(jià)提供了必要的信息。 國(guó)外學(xué)者關(guān)于企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)對(duì)高管薪酬是否有一定影響的研究很早就開始了，研究的比較透徹，也明顯領(lǐng)先于我國(guó)學(xué)者的研究。但是考慮到我國(guó)的基本國(guó)情，許多國(guó)外的研究并不一定同樣適用于我國(guó)，所以我們應(yīng)該在國(guó)外研究的基礎(chǔ)上，取其精華，，去其糟粕，結(jié)合我國(guó)的具體國(guó)情進(jìn)行研究。所以，本文在國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究的基礎(chǔ)上，具體結(jié)合中國(guó)上市金融企業(yè)高管薪酬、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系做了研究。 本文采用文獻(xiàn)與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的研究方法進(jìn)行研究，檢驗(yàn)了從2001年到2012年之間中國(guó)金融企業(yè)高管薪酬、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)論表明，中國(guó)金融行業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官薪酬已經(jīng)在過去的十年中顯著增加，而且金融和非金融企業(yè)之間的管理層薪酬的相對(duì)差異也顯著增加。中國(guó)金融業(yè)高管薪酬是基于政治關(guān)系的，而不是一個(gè)以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的契約。與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的以機(jī)構(gòu)為基礎(chǔ)的理論和以前的研究結(jié)果相反，很少有證據(jù)支持首席執(zhí)行官薪酬與公司的股票收益率（RET）或資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率（ROA）的指標(biāo)呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。目前中國(guó)的高管薪酬在設(shè)定績(jī)效工資方面只有很少的證據(jù)支持點(diǎn)。當(dāng)公司規(guī)模在高管薪酬中有顯著的正面影響時(shí)，股權(quán)集中度有顯著的負(fù)面影響。此外，薪酬委員會(huì)很友好地提高高管薪酬，但是國(guó)家所有權(quán)的參與往往會(huì)限制高管薪酬。結(jié)果表明，當(dāng)公司治理薄弱時(shí)，政府或者監(jiān)管可以在業(yè)務(wù)活動(dòng)領(lǐng)域確保有效的公司治理。研究結(jié)果對(duì)管理者和董事會(huì)成員對(duì)薪酬管理和激勵(lì)水平測(cè)量有著重要的意義，而且在金融業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制中也有著重要的意義。
[Abstract]:Over the past decade or so, economists have been paying more and more attention to executive compensation, but most of their research has come from developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.And the availability of data in developed countries is another important reason to focus on executive compensation.Considering that corporate governance plays an important role in economic development, the research on executive compensation is increasing.However, given the importance of executive pay research in developed countries, it is also essential for companies in developing countries to focus on executive pay.In particular, for transition economies, through various reform measures, efforts to transform their state-owned enterprises into profitable modern enterprises, effective management incentives are key factors for successful economic transformation.Since executive performance pay represents the incentive system of top management, it is meaningful to carefully study whether the performance of modern enterprises has a certain impact on executive compensation.It provides the necessary information for the current reform and the design evaluation of the future reform measures.Foreign scholars on whether corporate performance has a certain impact on executive compensation has started a long time ago, the research is more thorough, but also obviously ahead of the study of Chinese scholars.However, considering the basic situation of our country, many foreign studies are not necessarily applicable to our country, so we should take the essence of the study, discard the dross, and combine with the specific conditions of our country.Therefore, based on the research of scholars at home and abroad, this paper makes a study on the relationship between executive compensation, equity structure and corporate performance of listed financial enterprises in China.This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation, equity structure and corporate performance of Chinese financial enterprises from 2001 to 2012 by using the method of combining literature and empirical research.The findings show that the compensation of chief executives in China's financial sector has increased significantly over the past decade, and the relative differences in executive compensation between financial and non-financial companies have also increased significantly.Executive compensation in China's financial sector is based on political relations, not a market-based contract.Contrary to the institution-based theory in developed countries and previous research results, there is little evidence to support a positive correlation between CEO compensation and the indicators of the firm's return on equity or return on assets.At present, executive compensation in China has little evidence to support performance pay.When firm size has a significant positive impact on executive compensation, equity concentration has a significant negative impact.In addition, compensation committees are friendly in raising executive pay, but state-owned participation tends to limit executive pay.The results show that when corporate governance is weak, government or regulation can ensure effective corporate governance in the field of business activities.The results are of great significance to managers and board members in the measurement of salary management and incentive level, as well as in the risk control of the financial industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.3;F830.42

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