【摘要】：本文以2004-2009年間A股國(guó)有上市公司為研究樣本,考察了高管參政議政對(duì)公司過(guò)度投資水平的影響。結(jié)果表明,高管參政議政能夠顯著降低自由現(xiàn)金流的過(guò)度投資,而在制度環(huán)境越差的地區(qū),高管參政議政與自由現(xiàn)金流過(guò)度投資之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系越強(qiáng)。上述結(jié)論說(shuō)明,國(guó)有企業(yè)高管參政議政體現(xiàn)了政治激勵(lì)的作用。本文的研究意義在于:與已有文獻(xiàn)多關(guān)注薪酬激勵(lì)不同,本文以高管參政議政這一普遍現(xiàn)象為切入點(diǎn),考察了政治激勵(lì)對(duì)國(guó)有上市公司治理機(jī)制的作用;與此同時(shí),中國(guó)的國(guó)有企業(yè)改革一直備受關(guān)注,本文的結(jié)論表明,高管政治激勵(lì)能夠有效地改善國(guó)有上市公司的治理機(jī)制,這一發(fā)現(xiàn)為提高國(guó)有企業(yè)投資效率、規(guī)范國(guó)有企業(yè)投資體制提供了有益的政策參考。
[Abstract]:In this paper, A-share state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2009 as a sample to investigate the impact of executive participation in politics on the level of overinvestment. The results show that executive participation in politics can significantly reduce the over-investment of free cash flow, and the negative relationship between executive participation in politics and free cash flow overinvestment is stronger in the areas where the institutional environment is worse. The above conclusion shows that state-owned enterprise executives participate in politics and discuss politics. The research significance of this paper lies in: different from the existing literature, this paper studies the role of political incentives on the governance mechanism of state-owned listed companies by taking the common phenomenon of executive participation in politics and discussion of politics as the starting point. The reform of state-owned enterprises in China has been paid much attention to. The conclusion of this paper shows that the political incentive of senior executives can effectively improve the governance mechanism of state-owned listed companies. This finding is aimed at improving the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Standardizing the investment system of state-owned enterprises provides a useful policy reference.
【作者單位】： 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“不完全樣本下的統(tǒng)計(jì)推斷問(wèn)題及其應(yīng)用研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):11001224) 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)校管課題項(xiàng)目“我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)漲跌幅限制的效果分析及其幅度設(shè)定”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2010XG087)資助
【分類號(hào)】：F276.1;F832.51;F224

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉廣;陳建國(guó);;上市公司過(guò)度投資行為與其機(jī)構(gòu)投資者關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2011年24期

2 顧湘;朱丹;;基于多元線性回歸模型的上市公司過(guò)度投資行為研究[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2011年14期

3 王紅艷;廖英姿;;所有制、市場(chǎng)分割與公司資本配置效率[J];山東工商學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2011年04期

4 李潔;;政府控制市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程與自由現(xiàn)金流的過(guò)度投資[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題探索;2011年08期

5 許s，

本文編號(hào)：2279566